Prohibition from acting is a theoretical attempt towards drawing the boundaries between the right to act and the legal capacity to act.

To what extent can an individual have an obligation to any other person to waive the disposal of the funds that fall within his financial disposal? Is such a waiver, even if it is contractually, valid and legitimate? This question carries with it a clear paradox as to whether an individual is able to deprive himself of the freedom to dispose of his property through the exercise of another freedom – namely contractual freedom, and therefore jurisprudence clearly sheds light on the conflict that occurs between the possibility of depriving an individual of the freedom to dispose of his property through freedom of belief. It is clear that the validity of the condition preventing conduct of a contractual nature must be addressed on the basis that contractual freedom always presupposes the validity or legality of the object of the contract - specifically the object of the obligation - or its legality. However, the condition preventing the act necessarily calls us to question the validity and legality of the contractual obligation by the owner who has deprived himself or restricted him from the freedom to dispose of his property, since such a condition inevitably leads to prejudice to his ability to act and the principle of freedom of circulation of funds.